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We analyze the impact of different organizational structures on incentives to invest in 
railways: vertical integration, vertical separation, and a hybrid form. Economic theory 
predicts that vertical integration fosters socially optimal investment, whereas, due to 
potential hold-up problems, both vertical separation and hybrid forms cause severe 
underinvestment. We test these theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment and 
find evidence that, in a vertically integrated environment, the level of investment in 
rolling stock and in rail infrastructure is roughly socially optimal. The complete 
absence of a discrepancy in our experimental results between vertical separation and 
the hybrid organisational structure, contradicting the predictions of model-theory, is 
surprising and can be attributed to the relatively high investments in the separated 





Since European policy is presently demanding more competition in European railways, 
vertical relationships in railways are the subject of substantial controversy. Advocates of a 
vertical separation of infrastructure from transport operation argue that, even if vertically 
integrated firms are obliged to grant third-party access to railway infrastructure, potential for 
market foreclosure and discrimination will continue to exist and competition will remain 
restricted (Nash and Preston, 1994; European Commission, 1996; Link, 2003). Therefore, 
vertical separation is regarded as the only way to enhance competition within the railway 
industry. Proponents of vertical integration argue that an institutional separation would reduce 
economic welfare, because of losses of economies of scope, of lower consumer attractiveness 
due to coordination failure and of insufficient investment as a result of asset specificity, 
incomplete contracts and hold-up hazards (Cantos, 2001;Pfund, 2003; Pittman, 2007).  
 
There is a large body of theoretical research that supports these positions, highlighting the 
drawbacks and inefficiencies of vertical separation, as well as the advantages and 
disadvantages arising from vertical integration solutions. This abundance of theoretical 
research contrasts with the low number of recent empirical studies, even though a  very 
substantial number of institutional settings for the railway sector have been established 
worldwide in the meantime  (that is Gomez-Ibanez, 2004; Cantos and Campos, 2005; Nash, 
2006). According to Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2007) the lack of empirical evidence is due to 
the fact that most of these settings are not comparable, in particular due to the short time 
horizon of reform experiences. Sufficiently large data bases necessary for analytical research 
are available only for a few of the relevant variables. Most previous studies on vertical 
separation test for economies of scope (Preston, 1996; Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009) and 
analyze the implications on competition and on efficiency and productivity growth (Nash and 
Preston, 1994; Bitzan, 2003; Friebel et al., 2003; Driessen et al., 2006; Sanchez et al., 2008). 4 
 
 
Up to now, there is only one empirical study on asset specificity, incomplete contracts, hold 
ups and investment behaviour in different institutional settings of rail industry by Merkert, 
Nash and Smith (2008). From the perspective of the New Institutional Economics, the authors 
analyze the impact of the governance structures of British, German and Swedish railways on 
competition and on the transaction costs of different interactions between infrastructure 
managers and train operators. The data have been collected by reviewing policy documents 
and contracts from seven pre-specified transaction areas and interviews with infrastructure 
managers, senior managers from train operators, regulators and industry associations. The 
results show that, although asset specificity and incomplete contracts do exist, the frequency, 
uncertainty and complexity of coordination and contractual interactions are perceived as more 
relevant than investment hold-up or lock-in issues (p. 27). All in all, the authors conclude that 
vertical separation turns out to be the “clearest approach in terms of non-discrimination” and 
viable at reasonable cost, in “terms of transaction cost economics” (p. 40). 
 
In order to determine whether a separate railway organization would reduce or even eliminate 
the incentive to invest on one or even both sides (the infrastructure provider and the transport 
operator), so that underinvestment may occur, raising costs and diminishing welfare in the 
long run, we adopt an experimental approach. Based on the seminal work of Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) on specific investments and the structure 
of vertical relationships, we model investment behaviour in various institutional arrangements 
in railways, hypothesize corresponding investment levels and test these hypotheses through 
experimental research. Such research provides an alternative framework to systematically 
designing varying institutional settings and analysing the resultant incentive structures and 
their impact on economic behaviour (Roth, 1995). In our case, the approach sheds some 
empirical light, from another perspective, on an important aspect of restructuring the 
European railway industry, an issue has so far been discussed by means of more or less 5 
 
 
qualitative arguments in case studies. The fundamental question is whether the investment 
incentives associated with a separate institutional arrangement can cause a long-term 
investment problem and welfare losses. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we generally describe the hold-up 
problem and show the relevance of specific investments, opportunistic behavior and 
incomplete contracts in railways. In Section 3, our model of investment behavior in different 
organizational structures is introduced, so that the expected investment levels can be 
hypothesized. Section 4 contains the experimental design. In Section 5, the experimental 
results with respect to investment incentives are presented. In Section 6, the results are 
discussed, before we close with a summary and some future perspectives. 
 
2.0 Specific Investments, Incomplete Contracts and Underinvestment in 
Railways: Theory and Previous Research 
 
According to modern institutional economics, a vertical separation of infrastructure from 
operations in network industries is an inferior form of organization, if investments are specific 
and contracts incomplete (Williamson, 1975 and 1985; Klein et al., 1978; Crocker and 
Masten, 1991). Because specific investments yield significantly lower values or lower gains 
from trade, when employed in a transaction other than originally intended (Joskow, 2003), the 
investor bears the risk of being exploited by an opportunistic transaction partner, who will 
appropriate the difference between the value of the investment in its first and second-best use 
(quasi-rent) in an ex-post bargaining process. If the investor anticipates the risk of a hold-up 
and if contractual arrangements to avert hold-ups are hindered by incomplete contracts, he 
will not undertake the investment at all. In network industries, underinvestment may occur on 6 
 
 
either side of the transaction. The vertical integration of infrastructure and operations could 
constitute an institutional setting which prevents disincentives to invest.  
 
Previous research on the rail industry had indeed identified asset specificity in the network 
infrastructure as well as in the rolling stock. Primary arguments are the strong technical 
interdependency of both of the input factors and the fact that investments not only require 
significant financial resources, but most often are completely irreversible (that is 
Rothengatter, 2001; Gomez-Ibanez, 2004; Cantos and Campos, 2005; Pittman, 2005). Various 
empirical studies have attempted to document and estimate asset specificity. Yvrande-Billon 
(2004) estimated a high level of specificity, measured by the impossibility of re-deployment 
of the rolling stock of British railways. According to Affuso and Newbery (2002), up to 82 
per cent of each asset of the transport companies in Great Britain are specific. Ferreira (1997), 
Crozet (2004), Bouf et al. (2005), von Hirschhausen and Siegmann (2004) and Merkert et al. 
(2008) detected asset specificities of different kinds (physical specificity, site specificity, 
dedicated specificity and temporal specificity) and different levels of relevance down-stream 
on the infrastructure level as well as up-stream on the operational level of rolling stock. 
 
Common examples of asset specificity in the railway context are investments in high-speed 
rail lines and in modern signal and safety technology, such as the European Train Control 
System (ETCS) which allows for higher capacities and higher operating densities, due to the 
economization of permanent signalling equipment through the direct transmission of 
propulsion command via GSM (de Rus and Nombela, 2007; International Union of Railways, 
2003). Investment in high-speed rail tracks and ETCS-infrastructure is enormously cost-
intensive for infrastructure companies and requires simultaneous investments in rolling stock 
by a transport operator who pays for and uses the track for a period sufficient for an 7 
 
 
amortization of the infrastructure investment. As Pittman (2007) points out, “a track operator 
can make certain investments to improve efficiency and performance, but the realization of 
these benefits depends significantly on actions taken by the train operator”. If the 
technological demand for transport operation exhibits a lower level than high-speed rail and 
ETCS, it is impossible to maintain an appropriate price for track usage (Nash, 2005). The 
value of the investments will decrease. This is correspondingly true vice versa, if the transport 
operator invests in high-speed trains or implements ETCS in rolling stock without 
corresponding investments from the infrastructure operator, as in the case of Virgin Rail, a 
British transport company (Pfund, 2003). 
 
In order to avoid the hazards of “downgrading” the infrastructure and rolling stock, 
investments have to be coordinated very exactly, so as to produce the final output of 
transportation and to improve quality in terms of timesaving and safer transport. With 
separate environments for rail infrastructure and transport operation, efficient coordination 
fails to take place, because of disincentives to invest on both sides as a result of hold-up risks 
and incomplete contracts. Since investment behaviour is neither fully observable nor 
enforceable by law “subject to shirking and opportunism, the investments on both sides may 
not be made and economic welfare will suffer as a result” (Pittman, 2007). A potentially 
superior institutional solution could take the form of vertical integration, which is proved 
empirically by the experiment described in the present paper.  
 
3.0 Theoretical Model 
In order to test the hypothesis that vertical integration is the superior form of organization in 
the railway industry with respect to asset specificities, we use the standard models of 
Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995). Theory states that 8 
 
 
incentives to invest depend on ownership structure. Because ownership structures in European 
railways are established politically in conformity with EU guidelines (European Commission 
1991 and 2001), we develop three different scenarios with exogenously predetermined 
ownership structures: 
 
(1) vertical separation  
(2) vertical integration  
(3) hybrid form of organization.  
 
Ownership rights affect the incentive structure in determining the extent to which an investor 
can claim a generated surplus and thereby recover at least his initial investment costs. Hence, 
ownership creates the incentive to invest. We assume that investments are embodied in 
physical capital such as rolling stock and rail infrastructure, rather than in human capital. 
From this, it follows that the value of the investment is not bound to the investor, but solely to 
the respective asset.
1 Furthermore, ownership of an asset assigns the right to make an 
investment, as well as the ability to transfer this right, since making the investment is assumed 
not to be specific to a particular individual.  
 
Investment decision rights are allocated to the transport operator (F1) and the infrastructure 
operator (F2), together producing the final good of railway transport by a combination of the 
two specific assets of rolling stock (a1) and rail infrastructure (a2). In fact, the transport 
operator uses the track to produce transport activities. Depending on the ownership structure, 
both actors can either be completely autonomous firms or departments within one integrated 
                                                 
1 If the investments were embodied in human capital, rather than in physical capital, an acquisition of the 
complementary asset, that is vertical integration, would not enable the new owner to generate a full surplus, 
because part of the investment’s value would be tied to the former owner himself. Thus, in the case of 
integration, the acquiring firm would still have to negotiate with the former owner, in order to obtain full access 
to the investment, although it already controls the physical asset.  9 
 
 
firm. The gross surplus derived from the transport activity (S) depends on specific 
investments in rolling stock (i1) and in the rail infrastructure (i2): S(i1,i2). Investments increase 
the productivity of the assets and are made in period t = 1, in which investment costs c(i1) and 
c(i2) accrue to the investing party. Although in t = 1, it is clear that specific investments are 
required to produce the final good of transportation, uncertainty prevails as to the precise asset 
configuration. This is due to the fact that, particularly in the context of railways, the 
production of the final good is highly complex and therefore, the costs of defining a 
comprehensive contract over the exact uses of a1 and a2 are assumed to be prohibitively high. 
This uncertainty also means that ex-ante contracting involving the division of the surplus from 
cooperation, is not feasible. Hence, the allocation of gross surplus cannot take place until 
investment is sunk and uncertainty is resolved in the next period, t = 2. Figure 3.1. 
summarises this chronology of action.  
 
------------------------------------ 




We assume that in the case considered here, the gross surplus from production S(i1,i2) is 
defined as  ) ( 20 ) , ( 2 1 2 1 i i i i S + = . Investment costs c(i1) and c(i2) are defined as  1 1 15 ) ( i i c =  and 
2 2 15 ) ( i i c = . Investments can be chosen from the interval { } 10 ,..., 2 , 1 , 2 1 ∈ i i . 
 
3.1 Vertical separation 
In the case of vertical separation, one of the pure forms of privatization alternatives, the 
transport operator F1 and the infrastructure operator F2 are completely autonomous firms. 10 
 
 
Each possesses one productive asset, that is, F1  owns and controls a1 and F2 owns and 
controls a2, so that the transport operator contributes to the provision of transport by making 
the rolling stock available, while the infrastructure operator contributes to the production of 
the final good of transportation, by providing the rail infrastructure. Consequently, both actors 
independently and simultaneously choose investments in t = 1. After uncertainty is resolved in 
t = 2, they bargain over the infrastructure charge and type, determining the division of the 
resultant gross surplus S(i1,i2). Finally, when the actors reach agreement and trade occurs, ex-
post pay pay-offs are realized for the transport operator ( 1 Π ) and the infrastructure operator (
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       (3.2) 
b denotes the transport operator’s negotiated share of the surplus, (1 - b) the infrastructure 
operator’s share in the case of agreement. However, it is important to note that a surplus is 
generated only if both actors agree to trade. Otherwise, the production of the final good is 
impeded, since both actors withdraw their asset from the production process. Since 
investments are sunk, each has to bear his individual investment costs.  
 
In our model, bargaining follows a Rubinstein alternating-offer structure with a maximum of 
ten bargaining rounds (Rubinstein, 1982) and a multiple-pie finite-horizon bargaining setting 
(Sloof, 2004).
2 In each bargaining round, one round-pie is negotiated between the two players. 
The size of each round-pie is 1/10 S(i1,i2). Both actors alternate in making offers with respect 
to the division of the ten round-pies, with the first offer being randomly assigned to one of the 
                                                 
2 In the interest of simplification, we disregard any other discounting effects. This guarantees the implementation 
of an exactly symmetrical Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950). Any further discounting would have caused a 
first-mover advantage for the subject with the right of first offer. Here, backward induction predicts a sub-game 







players. Actors are allowed to respond to offers in three different ways. Firstly, they can 
accept the offer and the round-pie of the current bargaining round, with all remaining round-
pies being divided according to the agreement. Secondly, the responder can reject the offer 
and terminate negotiations. In this case, the current and all remaining round-pies are 
irrevocably lost and, consequently, both players receive nothing. Thirdly, the player can reject 
and submit a counter offer instead. Bargaining then proceeds to the next round and the current 
round-pie is lost, this in turn reflecting the cost of negotiation. Finally, b and (1-b) are 
determined by bargaining. 
We assume that the gains from trade are divided according to the Nash bargaining solution, 
that is, a 50/50 division of the surplus (Nash, 1950), so that investments result from the 
optimization of equations (3.3) and (3.4):
  
), ( ) , (
2
1
1 2 1 1 i c i i S − ⋅ = Π      (3.3) 
). ( ) , (
2
1
2 2 1 2 i c i i S − ⋅ = Π
3     (3.4) 
Since  ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 i c i c i i S + > does apply, in a first-best world, where coordination between the 
two parties is feasible, F1 as well as F2 would have an incentive to invest the maximum 
amount of i1,2=i
max. In the absence of hold-up threats, the parties could redistribute any 
increase in value by means of ex ante lump-sum transfers.  
 
However,  1 1) / ( 2 / 1 c i S δ δ δ < ⋅ and  2 2) / ( 2 / 1 c i S δ δ δ < ⋅ imply that individually, in an 
incomplete contracting world with rational and self-interested actors, investment entails 
strictly negative net pay-offs. This results from the fact that any increase in value,  , / i S δ δ  
must be shared equally with the other partner, whereas increasing investment costs are 
incurred on one’s own. Consequently, the marginal costs of investment exceed the marginal 
                                                 
3 This is true for  0 / > i S δ δ  and  . 0 /
2 2 = i S δ δ  For the sake of simplicity, investment costs are assumed to be 
linear, so that 0 / > i c δ δ  and  . 0 /
2 2 = i c δ δ  12 
 
 
benefits. Both the transport operator and the infrastructure operator will invest the minimum 
of i1 = i2 = i
min, both anticipating opportunistic behaviour in the form of a hold-up by the 
other party.
4 Given the abovementioned parameterization,  1 2 1 5 10 i i − = Π  and  2 1 2 5 10 i i − = Π   
describe the individual optimisation problems. Hence, for the transport operator, the choice of 
i1 = imin = 1 is optimal and for the infrastructure operator, it is optimal to choose i2 = imin = 1. 
This situation resembles a prisoners’ dilemma and results in bilateral underinvestment. The 
prisoners’ dilemma is documented by Figure 3.2. and depicts the profits accruing to the 
players at three different levels of investment (1, 5, 10). Combination (i1, i2) = (1; 1) is a Nash 
equilibrium with a resulting overall profit of ∏1+∏2=5+5=10, which is inferior to individually 
unstable investments of 10, generating an overall profit of ∏1+∏2=50+50=100. 
 
------------------------------------ 





3.2 Vertical integration 
In the model of vertical integration, one fully integrated railway company owns the rights of 
control over the net infrastructure and the rolling stock, as well as the investment rights. 
Therefore, there is no hold-up hazard and the investor can fully internalise revenue derived 
                                                 
4 Only after their own investment is sunk, do the agents learn of the other party’s investment. In this respect, 
other constellations are also possible. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) and Smirnov and Wait (2004) concentrate, 
for example, on the problem of underinvestment in the case of sequential investments. In the railway context, 
existing monitoring and contract-enforcement problems imply that the application of simultaneous investments 
is advisable.  13 
 
 
from his investments. The integrated firm’s investment incentives, therefore, are expressed in 
the optimising the following equation:
5  
          ). ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2 i c i c i i S − − = Π      (3.5) 
Accordingly, the model predicts maximal investment levels for the integrated case: i1 = i2 = 
i
max. Given the abovementioned parameterization,  ) ( 5 2 1 2 i i + = Π is true, investments in 
rolling stock and in transport operation reach their maximum levels: i1 = i2 = imax = 10, and 
thus, i1 + i2 = 20. 
 
In the separate structure, the need to recover investment costs implies an incentive to fully 
utilize the enhanced productivity of assets. This holds, because any quality loss due to a 
reduction in effort would be counterproductive, given one’s own prior investment decision.
6 
However, in an integrated arrangement, this is not true for all production steps, taking into 
account that the transport division cannot make investment decisions and does not have to 
bear any investment costs. Given individual self-interest and rational behaviour, the result is 
shirking by the transport division, in order to minimize the disutility of work (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). Although shirking reduces the efficiency of those parts of the production 
process involving the transport operator’s effort and decreases the marginal benefits of 
investment, shirking does not affect investment incentives, because marginal benefits still 
significantly exceed marginal cost.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Equation (3.5) denotes the integrated firms’ ex-post pay-off in the case of Type 2 integration (see Hart, 1995, 
p.35), that is, F2 integrates F1 and thus, becomes the sole owner of the entire set of assets, a1 and a2. 
Alternatively, we could have considered the case of Type 1 integration. Given the symmetry of parameterization, 
this would not have any effect on the theoretical predictions regarding investment incentives. Therefore, we 
content ourselves with the analysis of one case. 
6 Taking this aspect into consideration further strengthens the consistency of our experimental investigation, 
since this aspect implies interaction between F1 and F2, although F2 is the sole owner of the assets and makes the 
investment decisions. 14 
 
 
3.3 Hybrid model 
Considering the ownership-structure continuum, which is bounded by full integration on one 
side and full separation on the other, there are obviously several alternative hybrid 
organizational designs (Ferreira, 1997). Below, we model a structure which partly separates 
the rights to control the assets from those of making an investment. Accordingly, the final 
good of rail transportation is produced by a company which is subdivided into two divisions: 
the transport operator and the dominant infrastructure operator. The rights of control over 
rolling stock a1 and rail infrastructure a2 are assigned to the dominant infrastructure operator 
F2.
7 Thus, analogously to the integrated case, this model also allows a full internalization of 
investments revenue. Nevertheless, this model differs in terms of investment-rights allocation. 
In particular, the dominating infrastructure operator transfers the responsibility and right to 
invest in the rolling stock to the dominated transport operator and pays remuneration w to F1, 
after receiving the complete gross surplus from the investments. Hence, in the first step, the 
transport operator decides on investment i1 and in the second step, he receives the 
compensation. 
      ), ( 1 1 i c w− = Π      (3.6) 
      . ) ( ) , ( 2 2 1 2 w i c i i S − − = Π      (3.7) 
Because the infrastructure operator possesses all control rights and, therefore, full residual 
claimant status, his incentive is to invest the maximum amount i2 = i
max. His marginal benefits 
from investment exceed the marginal costs. The transport operator only decides to invest i1 = 
i
min in anticipation of rational and self-interested behaviour from the infrastructure operator, 




                                                 
7 To ensure consistency with regard to the integration model, we obviously consider Type 2 integration here as 
well. 
8 Note that F1 must invest at least the minimum of i1 = 1. 15 
 
 
Given the above parameterization,  1 1 15i w− = Π  and  w i i − + = Π 2 1 2 5 20  are true. In 
equilibrium, the transport operator invests an amount of i1 = imin = 1 and the infrastructure 
operator an amount of i2 = imax = 10. As a result, unilateral underinvestment occurs and the 
model of hybrid organisation is therefore inferior to the integrated model but, in terms of 
investment incentives, superior when compared to the separated model. Table 3.1. 
summarises the standard theoretical predictions of investment behaviour and bargaining 
outcomes, given our parameterization.  
------------------------------------ 




4.0 Experimental Design  
The experimental investigation consisted of six treatments, both multi- and single-period 
games for each of the three models. The computer-based experiments were carried out at the 
Department of Economic Studies, Muenster University, Germany, in 2006. 256 respondents 
were recruited from a homogenous group of students studying economics at an advanced 
level.  For each treatment, the subject group was divided into two subgroups, half being 
assigned the role of transport operator (F1) and the other the role of infrastructure operator 
(F2). Subjects kept their role throughout the experiment. They were paid according to 
performance and earned, on average, €12.50 per hour.
  
 
The multi-period treatment consisted of 12 rounds, during which each of the respondents were 




9 Thus, all had identical information about the rules and structure of the game. In 
order to ensure that any player knew the consequences of his decisions, we provided a 
simulation device. The simulator enabled the calculation of outcomes of investment and 
bargaining decisions throughout the game. The subjects were also informed about the 
matching procedure. Hence, reputational effects should be minimized. Furthermore, the 
subgroups were located in separate rooms and communication within the subgroup was 
strictly forbidden. This ensured that no player could forecast his current partner’s decisions on 
the basis of past behaviour.  
 
Each round involved two stages, an investment and a bargaining stage. This applies to the 
single-period scenarios as well as to the multi-period scenarios.
10 The single-period games 
involved a single play of the two-stage game. At the investment stage, the subjects were 
requested to simultaneously choose their investment levels. However, as described above, the 
right to invest depends on the ownership structure. In the separated case and the hybrid case, 
both players – the one assigned the role of infrastructure operator and the counterpart – were 
provided with the right to invest in one of the assets. However, in the integrated case, the 
infrastructure operator had the right to invest in both assets, the rolling stock and the 
infrastructure. At the bargaining stage, the impact of the considered ownership structures on 
the nature of the game was greater than at the first stage. In the integrated and hybrid cases, 
stage two consisted of the choice of compensation level by the infrastructure player. At stage 
two of the separation scenario, the players were asked to allocate the surplus generated in 
stage one by the abovementioned bargaining process. 
 
                                                 
9 The detailed instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
10 For simplicity, we will call the second stage the bargaining stage throughout the remainder of the paper, even 
though, in the integrated case and the hybrid case, the second stage is more likely to resemble a dictator game 
rather than a bargaining game.  17 
 
 
In each of the considered treatments, the subjects were informed about the chosen investment 
levels before proceeding to the bargaining stage. At the end of stage two of each treatment, 
payments were made according to the bargaining results and, finally, investment costs were 
incurred by the investors. In the multi-period games, both players subsequently moved to the 
next game period and were again randomly matched with a partner. In the single-period 






5.0 Experimental Results 
In the multi-period treatments 44 subjects participated in the separated case, 44 in the hybrid 
case and 42 in the integrated case. With respect to investment behaviour, the first result from 
the experiment is as follows: 
Result 1. Average investment levels are maximized in the integration model. 
Integration induces levels of investments close to the social optimum.  
The average total investment in rolling stock and rail infrastructure amounted to 14.70 in the 
separated case, 13.65 in the hybrid case, and 19.56 in the integration case. The experimental 
results thus evidently support the theoretical prediction with respect to the vertical integration 
model. In more than 92 per cent of the cases (466 out of 504), the respondents chose the 
efficient investment level i






Insert Table 5.1. about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
A pair-wise comparison of the investments, conducted by means of the Mann-Whitney-U-
Test, indicates the superiority of the integrated model (p < .01). Table (5.1.) shows the results 
from three non-parametric tests, examining total investments for rounds 1-12.   
Result 2. The hybrid case does not provide higher investment incentives than the 
separated model. Both the separation and the hybrid cases cause underinvestment 
with respect to the social optimum, but exceed theoretical predictions from the 
models.  
A comparison of theoretical predictions with the investment results from the experiment 
reveals that, in the separation case as well as in the hybrid case, investments clearly exceed 
the equilibrium results of the models (separation case: 14,70 > 2, hybrid case: 13,56 > 11). 
The complete absence of any difference in our experimental results between vertical 
separation and the hybrid organisational structure, contradicting the predictions of model-
theory, is surprising and can largely be attributed to the relatively high investments in the 
separated model. However, investment in the separation case exceeded that of the hybrid case 
by roughly 1.05 (p = .002). This result was driven partly by the final three rounds. A detailed 
examination of total investment indicates that in 9 of 12 rounds, average total investments do 
not differ significantly from each other. Figure 5.1. further reveals a parallel development of 
total investment in the hybrid and separation cases in rounds 1 to 7. Whereas, from round 8 19 
 
 




Insert Figure 5.1. about here 
------------------------------------ 
In the single-period treatments, 42 subjects participated in the separated case, 44 in the hybrid 
case and 42 in the integration case. An examination of investments in the single-period 
treatments yields similar findings to those reported for the multi-period treatments (Fig. 5.2.). 
Although the results seem to match the rank order of theoretical predictions more closely, 
investments do not differ significantly between the separation (12.75) and hybrid cases 
(14.32). Average investments in rolling stock and rail infrastructure of the integration case 
(19.71) remain significantly superior and close to the social optimum. Yet, it is noticeable that 
investments in the first round of the multi-period games – 11.27 in the hybrid case, 11.18 in 
the separated case, and 18.33 in the integrated case – do not reach comparable levels. Thus, to 
some extent, the subjects may have relied on learning-by-doing in the multi-period treatments; 
this in turn indicates some kind of randomness in early-round decisions.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5.2. about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
6.0 Discussion and Further Results 
The results of our experimental analysis largely confirm the theoretical predictions of 
investment behaviour in different institutional arrangements in the railway sector. In a world 
                                                 
11 This growing discrepancy might originate from some form of last-period effect, as the test participants were 
asked to take part in at least 8 rounds. Last-period effects result in uncooperative player behavior in the final 
rounds of repeated games, because misbehavior cannot be sanctioned. However, since subjects were randomly 
matched with other partners in each round, direct sanctioning was not feasible anyway. Nonetheless, F1s might 
have used underinvestment as a collective sanctioning device, this in fact losing credibility with an increasing 
probability of termination.  20 
 
 
of incomplete contracts and asset specificity, with respect to specific investments, full vertical 
integration is the superior organizational solution. The amounts invested by our respondents 
were closer to the social optimal values than the amounts invested in a hybrid or separated 
structure. However, while investments in the integration scenario almost reach the predicted 
value and investments in the hybrid scenario differ by 23 per cent, investments in the 
separation case substantially exceed the predicted levels.  
 
The existence of social preferences may explain this apparent contradiction.
12  In contrast to 
the utility functions of rational and self-interested actors, the utility functions of actors 
exhibiting social preferences also comprise the utility of the exchange partner. One potential 
outcome might be that actors do not consider investments as sunk at the time of negotiation, 
but expect the net benefits from investment to reflect the contribution of each player to the 
gross surplus, that is to investment cost (Homans, 1961; Selten, 1978). An investigation of the 
bargaining outcomes indicates that, in fact, a significant proportion of repsondents does index 
the bargaining behaviour to prior investments. In order to test whether equity theory can 
contribute to the explanation of observed investment behaviour, we estimate the following 
simple equation:  )] /( [ 2 1 1 i i i b + + = β α  with F1’s share b as the dependent variable and his 
relative contribution to the total surplus as the independent variable.
13  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6.1. about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
                                                 
12 For a brief overview of the different types of social preferences such as conditional cooperation, reciprocity, 
inequity aversion and the like, see Rabin, 1993; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002. 
13 Since our parameterization is linear, the individual contribution to gross surplus can be represented by the 
estimation of the influence of F2’s portion of costs on his obtained share. This must, and in fact does, yield 
equivalent results. We content ourselves with estimating F1’s share. 21 
 
 
Table (6.1.) displays the results of our estimations.
14 Basic OLS regressions with one 
independent variable, reacts very sensitively to outlying observations (Hackett, 1993). 
Therefore, we also applied a robust estimation technique to test the robustness of the 
estimation (Hamilton, 1991). Both estimations strongly support the notion that the individual 
contribution to gross surplus exerts a substantial influence on the outcome of bargaining. 
Hence, social preferences seem to influence investment incentives and might explain the 
observation of higher investment levels than those predicted theoretically.  
A further result of our experiment suggests that equal power due to shared ownership, as in 
the separation model, leads to efficiency losses, because of negotiation costs. In the sub-game 
perfect equilibrium, negotiations are successful and immediate, with bargaining terminating 
after the first round with breakdowns generally not being observed. This conclusion is based 
on the assumption of a homogenous group of actors. It follows that, since the sample 
becomes more heterogeneous, this result can no longer be retained, since rational actors 
might be disciplined by those with social preferences. Specifically, it may become rational to 
deviate from the theoretical prediction when confronted with potential and unexpected 
negotiation breakdowns by fair actors. Accordingly, in 24.6 per cent of cases, bargaining 
proceeds beyond round one. This causes efficiency losses of 25.7 per cent. In particular, total 
investments in all rounds amounted to 3.881, which corresponds to a net joint surplus of 
19.405. A profit of only 14.417 could yet be realized, due to agreement delays and 




                                                 
14 We also obtained positive coefficients for the single period game. However, the results were not significant. 
15 It is worth noting that our bargaining procedure places considerable emphasis on negotiation costs. Refusals 
immediately result in substantial losses. In reality, simple refusals are not expected to be that costly. 
Nevertheless, our results show that actors indeed use their bargaining power in order to enforce their interests, 
although they know how expensive this might be. See Hart and Moore (1988), Maskin and Moore (1999), who 




The present research paper constitutes an initial contribution to the empirical analysis of 
organizational structures and investment incentives in the railway sector. In general, our 
experimental results seem to indicate that, in a world of incomplete contracts, a vertical 
separation of railways as well as hybrid forms might cause deficits in innovation, quality and 
safety, due to underinvestment in relation-specific assets. Although the levels of investments 
in the separation and the hybrid scenario exceeded the theoretical predictions, they failed to 
match the social optimum.  
 
One of the main objectives of the European railways is the re-vitalization of rail traffic, which 
involves strengthening railway competitiveness in an intermodal comparison. The system’s 
high technical and organizational complexity impedes or at least limits the potential for 
complete contracts which cover every conceivable aspect of the transaction. In order to 
determine which organizational structure is most appropriate for macroeconomic purposes, it 
is of paramount importance to consider the numerous effects of these various structures. Not 
only are incentives to invest relevant, but also aspects such as additional synergy effects, 
economies of scope, competition, subsidies, privatization revenues or the marketability of the 
railway industry. However, the problems that occurred in Great Britain after the railway 
restructuring process indicate that, particularly in this sector, considering the incentives to 
invest in innovation, quality and safety may be a particularly important aspect, and one that 
has so far been underrated 
 
Our analysis shows that individual profit-maximizing behaviour may lead to suboptimal 
decisions from a macroeconomic perspective, which in turn could constrain the competitive 
capabilities of European railways. Our results are also of particular importance for the design 
of hybrid models. The case considered here involves the separation of the right to decide on 23 
 
 
investments and the right to control the respective asset within the production process. From 
this, it follows that the investing party did not have any sanctioning potential after the 
investment had been undertaken, which may explain the comparatively low investments in 
rolling stock. However, this constellation constitutes only one possible alternative to 
designing a hybrid organizational form. Consequently, other design options, which could 
potentially combine the advantages of the pure organizational forms more effectively, should 
be taken into account. In order to determine definitively which organizational structure is 
macro-economically superior, further quantitative-oriented research is required, especially to 
investigate the industrial-economic effects. However, it is advisable firstly to analyze the full 
impact of different organizational structures before making policy decisions.   
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Figure 3.2. Vertical separation and Prisoners’ dilemma 
i1 ; i2  1 5  10 
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Stage 1     
i1  1  10  1 
i2  1  10  10 
i12 = i1 + i2  2  20  11 
Stage 2     
b  0,5 
  
w     15 
No. of rounds  1  1*  1* 
Asterisks indicate that the number of bargaining 










Table 5.1. Investment Incentives, Two Sample, Non-Parametric Pair wise Tests 
  Average Investment Levels Mann-Whitney-U-Test 
 
Integratio
n  Hybrid 
Separatio
n  Int. and Sep.  Int. and Hyb.  Hyb. and Sep.
Variable  Case  Case  Case  Z  p > Z Z  p > Z  Z  p > Z
i1  9.78  4.  39*  7.51  -11.08 .000 
-
17.45  .000 
-
10.20  .000 
i2  9.79  9.  26*  7.19  -11.39 .000  -4.64  .000  -8.19  .000 
i1+i2  19.65  13.  65  14.70  -14.87 .000 
-
17.41  .000  -3.14  .002 
Asterisks indicate significant differences (<1%) within the same column, that is 
differences in investments between F1 and F2 in the respective treatment.  
 
 




















































































Table 6.1. Estimation Results F1, Separated Model 
      OLS  IRLS 
        
Robust  
Regression 
     
i1/(i1+i2)    0.566***  0.777*** 
  
(0.071)  (0.001) 
Constant    0.205***  0.110*** 
      (0.356)  (0.005) 
      
N    264  264 
F(1, 262)    63.880***  8954.460*** 
R²     0.439  0.439 
Dependent variable: F1's share of surplus b. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p 
< 0.001; ** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 